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Pedagogies of Indignation and The Lives of Others 
Introduction 
Critical Pedagogy has always had as part of its aim not just, as Henry Giroux states, to 
“illuminate[s] the relationships among knowledge, authority, and power” in educational 
settings.  As an ongoing political project, it also addresses “the relationship between how 
we learn and how we act as individual and social agents; that is, it is concerned with 
teaching students how not only to think but to come to grips with a sense of individual and 
social responsibility.” (Giroux, 2017).  As such, it is part of the role of critical educators to try 
to reach, in their theoretical work and in the classroom, an informed, reflective and rich 
understanding of the meaning and complexity of moral agency and its intersection with 
questions of social and political change.     
Philosophical work can inform this project in several ways.  These include work in political 
philosophy that offers normative accounts of justice, democracy or equality, and work in 
epistemology and moral theory that explores the ethical and political aspects of our 
epistemic practices and the complex relationship between individual agency, identity, 
knowledge, ignorance, injustice and oppression.  This work can enrich our discussions about 
the relationship, so central to critical pedagogy, between knowledge and experience, and 
social/political change. Yet in reflecting on these issues, it is important that we think not just 
about the political context of the relationships, ideas and individuals that populate schools 
and classrooms, but about the pedagogical relationships that go on elsewhere in our lives.  
Education is not the same as schooling, and there is value in exploring the moral and 
political significance of pedagogical spaces, processes and relationships outside the walls of 
institutions.   In this context, I was glad to read Rebecca Tarlau’s excellent recent paper on 
the need to bring together insights from Critical Pedagogy and Social Movement Theory 
(Tarlau, 2014). Tarlau quotes Jean Anyon, who calls for a synthesis between social 
movement and critical pedagogy literature, arguing that if this were to occur, "Critical 
pedagogy would take to the streets, offices, and courtrooms where social justice struggles 
play out." (Anyon, in Tarlau, 2014, p. 390)  
As Tarlau's own work illustrates, this is not just a practical call for political activists to draw 
on the resources and experience of critical pedagogues, but a call for an intellectual 
dialogue between the insights offered by theorists of Critical Pedagogy and theorists of 
social movements so as to enrich our understanding of how collective movements for social 
change can mobilize activists, articulate motivating conceptions of justice, and effectively 
enact opposition and dissent.   
However, in addition to the theoretical understanding of processes of mobilization and 
dissent offered by social movement theory, it is important that critical educators reflect, 
with themselves and with their students, on the personal, affective and epistemic aspects of 
the ways in which individual agents come to make ethically significant choices in conditions 
of political struggle. The philosophical questions here include not just questions of “what 
was the right choice to make?” but questions of how people come to make the choices they 
do, and whether we can make sense of them.  These questions are harder to pose, and 
harder to answer, when the moral consequences of people’s choices in situations of 
injustice, oppression and adversity, are ones that are not unequivocally good. Indeed, 
perhaps it is through confronting the uncomfortable questions raised by a reality in which 
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the pursuit of morally and politically defensible goals often leads people to act in ethically 
troubling ways that we can enrich and expand our understanding of moral agency and its 
relationship with social change.    
In the following discussion, I explore this possibility, beginning from the insistence that the 
way to address these moral questions, whether in classrooms or in philosophical discussion, 
is not through posing dilemmas between different courses of action as demanding an 
answer to the question  ”what would be the right thing to do?”, but through an in-depth 
engagement with narratives of agents in situations who have made difficult, perhaps 
impossible choices, in impossible situations, and where the question to ask is “how can we 
make sense of these choices and of their ethical significance?” 
Moral philosophers have addressed the value of the imagination in helping us to develop 
moral understanding and to nurture ethical capacities such as empathy (see e.g. Crary, 
2016; Nussbaum, 1990, 1995; Warnock, 1978)  Annette Baier specifically  - and 
controversially – argues that we need to engage with the violent acts of political terrorists, 
for “the first step toward getting articles of peace for our condition is to put ourselves in the 
shoes of those driven to terrorism, to entertain the thought that there but for the lottery of 
history (and perhaps but for saving cowardice) go we.” (Baier, 1995, p. 213).  Baier’s point is 
that questions about whether and when violent means can ever be seen as morally 
justifiable in the pursuit of morally just goals cannot be answered in the abstract. For “our 
attitudes to killing and to violent assault seem, in their baroque complexities, more 
amenable to historical and psychological explanation than to rational systematization and 
justification.” (ibid, p. 209).  
In what follows I focus on a situation of extreme oppression and injustice, and on a violent 
course of action taken by agents who are involved in this situation in different ways. In so 
doing, I draw on Baier’s insights, and also on the work of Jose Medina, who suggests that  
“under conditions of oppression, the most responsible epistemic subjects tend to be 
precisely those who are most disadvantaged by the oppression in question, […] they tend to 
exceed their epistemic duties and make epistemic contributions that (can) transform deeply 
the social knowledge available” (Medina, p. 187).  My discussion, therefore, is intended as a 
contribution to the theoretical exploration of moral agency and the epistemic conditions in 
which it emerges.  This exploration, as I have suggested, can make a significant contribution 
to the theoretical grounding of work in Critical Pedagogy intended to promote and pursue 
action for social justice.  Rather than creating imaginary scenarios to engage the 
imagination, I rely on a rich fictional account, rooted in political and historical reality.  This 
particular account has the further advantage of contributing to the expansion of the moral 
landscape of many critical educators and students in Western classrooms, where a great 
deal of theoretical work on Critical Pedagogy is authored and discussed, by taking us beyond 
the world that may be familiar to most of us.    
As Baier notes (1995, p. 209), most people have the luxury of learning their attitudes to and 
discriminations regarding “the morality of violence” in conditions of relative privilege.  Yet 
protest and rebellion against oppression regularly involve violence and danger to human 
life; dangers which will inevitably, as Baier says, “seem unjustified to many of those who 
have not suffered the injustices or inhumanities that are protested, and to those with 
limited imaginations or limited sympathy”.  (Baier, 1995, p. 214).   Of course there is no 
shortage of experience of oppression, disadvantage and injustice in the contexts in which 
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many critical pedagogues in industrialised, Western states are working. Nor is there any 
shortage, in this context, of stories of individuals and groups who have struggled to 
overcome and challenge such injustice.  But part of what I want to explore is whether there 
is a value, for our philosophical and moral understanding, in reflecting not just on familiar 
and successful stories of struggles for social justice, but on different, often ugly and possibly 
terrifying stories of such struggles; struggles that may be not only terrible and painful, but, 
ultimately, disastrous.   
I suggest that looking closely at such struggles may push us to ask some uncomfortable 
questions about the relationship between critical consciousness and action for social justice. 
I am not proposing that we reach for a theoretical resolution to these questions, but I am 
suggesting that asking them can push us to think deeply about important aspects of our 
moral and political lives, both as academics committed to the link between education and 
political action, and as educators concerned to encourage our students to reflect on moral 
values, moral agency, oppression, and resistance.  
 
Hopeful Stories 
Stories are an important element of the optimistic outlook behind the commitment to 
Critical Pedagogy.  One reason Critical Pedagogy is such a potent and educationally 
significant project, maybe now more than ever, is because of its message of hope; a 
message that Paulo Freire frequently reiterated. Articulating how hope is bound up with 
critique, Freire wrote:  
"Prophetic thought, which is also utopian, implies denouncing how we are living and 
announcing how we could live. It is, for this very reason, a hope-filled form of thought" 
(Freire, 2004, p. 105).  This is, as many have noted, not a naive utopianism, but a 
commitment to collective struggles conceived as an ongoing process of becoming conscious 
of our presence as actors in the world.  At the same time, it would not be much use 
defending a view of education linked to a vision of social change for the better if we did not 
have believable, hopeful stories - for ourselves and our students - of how collective action 
has succeeded in bringing about justice and freedom from oppression.  Much of the 
literature on Critical Pedagogy and social justice education draws on such stories, some of 
them familiar narratives like those of the Civil Rights movement, where acts of resistance to 
oppressive structures had an unambiguously positive result. Important recent work by 
philosophers (see e.g. Babbitt, 1996; Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) has complicated the often 
simplistic picture of virtuous individuals acting bravely to challenge unjust social structures, 
and has developed valuable accounts of the complex ways in which epistemic, cognitive and 
ethical processes and experiences interact to both enable and block forms of resistance. 
Nevertheless, the overall message is a hopeful one: given the right conditions, collective 
social action can lead to critical challenges to and the eventual dismantling of oppressive 
structures.  Indeed, a recognition of the complexity of intertwined forms of oppression and 
their contextuality is part of the moral imperative in much of this philosophical work.  Jose 
Medina, for example, in exploring how Rosa Parks' act of resistance cannot be understood 
independently of the collective agency of the emerging social movement of resistance, 
concludes with the powerful argument that those of us concerned with challenging 
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oppression need to "start by asking what the enabling and constraining effects are of the 
social contexts in which acts of resistance take place". (Medina, 2013, p. 241)    
There is, then, a crucial element of hope in these narratives; yet this is not the same kind of 
hope that Gur-Ze'ev, in his critique of Giroux's version of Critical Pedagogy, describes as an 
"easy optimism". Gur-Ze’ev's concern, as Gert Biesta explains, lies with  what he sees as the 
dangerous implications of Freire's  ”non-critical” preference for the self-evident knowledge 
of the oppressed to that of the oppressors; an  “easy optimism” and ”positive utopianism” 
that, in Gur-Ze’ev’s view, risks liberatory pedagogy turning into a potentially violent form of  
“counter- totalitarianism.” (Biesta, 1998, p. 502). 
The optimism I am talking about is not that which forms the basis of Gur-Ze'ev critique, and 
this is not just because I want to draw attention to the point that in Freire's own writings,  
anger plays almost as important a role as hope.  "I have the right to be angry and to express 
that anger, to hold it as my motivation to fight, just as I have the right to love and to express 
my love for the world”, Freire says in Pedagogy of Indignation (2004), where, as Donald 
Macedo notes (in Freire, 2004, p. xi), "Freire reiterates the importance of anger as part of a 
constitutive matrix that must be combined with hope" (ibid) and sees anger "as an appropri-
ate response to obscene violations of human rights and social injustices" (x-xi). 
  
The optimism that I am referring to is that implied by the very use of the familiar narratives 
that serve as examples of successful collective action for social change. The agents in these 
narratives  - Rosa Parks and her fellow activists in the NAACP; the landless peasants in Brazil 
- take actions that are recognized not just as morally justified as means to the end of realiz-
ing the moral principle  of justice; but as morally unproblematic in and of themselves. This, 
indeed, is the message of the humanistic core of Freire's position, reflected in Couch's  
(2009) rallying cry for Critical Pedagogy: “From the salt mines to Seattle, throughout history, 
movements such as these have challenged and deposed dictators, stopped armies, under-
mined corporations, established basic human rights and halted entire industries, all without 
the use of violence” (Couch, quoted in Ollis, 2012, p.3).  
 
It seems almost to follow from these narratives that a genuinely humanistic, emancipatory 
Critical Pedagogy will bring about a form of critical consciousness that, however indignant 
and angry, will not lead to a form of resistance that has morally repugnant, violent 
elements. 
I wonder, though, if we are not letting ourselves off  the hook in assuming this to be true, 
and in investing our theoretical resources in developing pedagogical strategies for bringing 
about critical consciousness in our students. Do we not owe it to ourselves, and to our 
students, to think about situations where indignation and critical consciousness of injustice, 
coupled with hope, can lead to far more ethically troubling and uncomfortable forms of 
action? Do we not, in thinking about what justice is, how it can be furthered, what leads 
individuals to take action in fighting injustice, and the pedagogical aspects of such action  -  
need to think not just about apparently successful and morally uplifting struggles, but also 
about less obviously successful, and perhaps morally troubling ones?  
If we want students who are going to be morally committed, politically engaged citizens 
who will act against injustice and oppression, perhaps we need to encourage them to think 
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critically and deeply about moral agency and about the roots of their own moral attitudes, 
including their attitudes to violence.  I suggest that a critical pedagogical engagement with 
these questions can perhaps be enriched not just through offering hopeful narratives of the 
triumph of moral reason and courage over fear, oppression and injustice, but through 
reflecting on more ethically complex and equivocal narratives, where hope and despair, 
moral triumph and moral failure, may be intertwined in far more complicated ways. 
Two key elements of Freirian Critical Pedagogy are the notion of critical consciousness, and 
the significance of acting in solidarity with the oppressed. These elements have significant 
pedagogical aspects, both within the classroom and in broader movements. Within the 
classroom, teachers can engage in dialogical Critical Pedagogy so as to bring about 
conscientization, both amongst students from marginalised groups and amongst members 
of privileged groups. Freire's work in this area has been both critiqued and built on by social 
justice educators, often drawing on work in feminist theory and critical race theory to show 
the complex intersection of forms of oppression, and to theorise the pedagogical value of 
moments of discomfort (see Boler and Zembylas, 2003; Zembylas, M. & McGlynn, 2012).  
Outside the classroom, Tarlau (2014) has described how social movement theorists draw on 
the idea of cognitive liberation in explaining the mechanisms through which a new 
consciousness of the injustice of their situation can help people engage in collective struggle 
for social change.  Likewise, it is central to Freire's commitments that the critically engaged 
agent determined to dismantle oppression must fight not for the oppressed but with them, 
and there are obvious pedagogical aspects of the experience of working and struggling as 
part of a collective movement of the oppressed. 
In what follows, I explore a story that shows how both these elements - critical 
consciousness and solidarity with the oppressed - play a central role in the life of an agent 
committed to acting to change an obviously unjust situation; but where the culmination of 
these cognitive, affective processes is not one of the triumph of justice or its success but 
one which, if not perhaps clearly a failure, is nevertheless very troubling.  
Bill Moyer has argued that critical pedagogy is “part of a project whose purpose is to dignify 
people so that they become fully free to claim their moral and political agency”. Inside the 
classroom, this means "opening up a space where students should be able to come to terms 
with their power as critical agents.” (Moyers, quoted in Giroux, 2007, p. 1). But outside the 
classroom, with people who have not even been able to enter into the arena of the 
classroom to begin with, how does one open up such spaces?  What are the moral 
constraints on what can constitute such opening up, and what are its possible costs? 
Focusing our attention on the ethical, affective and cognitive processes involved in allowing 
people to become fully free to claim their moral and political agency in a site of a difficult 
and desperate struggle, may give rise to some very uncomfortable thoughts that, while 
maybe not fully resolving these questions, at least forces us to seriously engage with them. 
 
The Lives of Others 
Neel Mukherjee's novel The Lives of Others (2014) centres around the Ghosh family and the 
rambling, complicated dynamic of their lives in the house that they all share  - the 
grandparents, three married sons, an unmarried daughter, and a widowed daughter-in-law - 
in Calcutta. They are a wealthy middle-class family, whose wealth has somewhat dwindled 
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due to recent political instability and bad management of the family business, but who 
nevertheless cling to their privileged social status and invest great energy in upholding their 
proud position within the local community. There is a clear hierarchy within the family, and 
intriguing stories of love, betrayal, jealousy and inter-generational conflict.  The narrative, 
most of which is set in 1967-68, moves between the house in Calcutta with its various 
inhabitants, and the central character of Supratik, who has disappeared, having, as a 
student, got involved in revolutionary politics.  Originally part of a Marxist student group, he 
becomes disillusioned with their party politics and joins the Maoist Naxalites, training to go 
deep into the countryside and plan an armed insurgency to claim back land for the 
impoverished and oppressed peasants. Part of the book is written in the form of letters that 
Supratik writes - but never sends  - to his young widowed aunt, with whom he is secretly in 
love, describing his experience in the movement.  
Although we are not told the full story of Supratik's moral and political development, and 
Mukherjee leaves open the question of how he began on his journey towards political 
consciousness, there are several key scenes in the book that show the development of his 
critical consciousness and how this cognitive process interacts with affective processes in 
leading to his resolve to leave home and join the Naxalites. One such key scene is recalled 
by his mother, who, after his disappearance, collapses physically and mentally and spends 
her time drifting around the house trying to piece together some story that will explain why 
he left, where he has gone, and how she can get him to come back.  
She remembers one night when Supratik came home late. He has, at that point, unbeknown 
to her, already become a key member of the local Maoist cell. He is often out late at meet-
ings, and she has waited up for him, concerned about the visible changes in his behaviour: 
"You're eating like a sparrow nowadays. You've hardly touched your food." 
“You give me so much. There are so many dishes." 
"Where so many? One dal, one fry, one vegetable dish, a bit of fish, that's it." 
"And don't you think that's a lot?" 
"You've eaten like this all your life", she said, baffled. 
"Don't you agree we eat too much?" 
"Who, you and I?" she asked, still puzzled. 
"No, no, by 'we' I mean all of us, everyone in our social and economic class. Don't you think 
that we have lots, that we could afford to lose a bit?" The grin had disappeared and all its 
traces too. Those big eyes flamed with a different kind of light now. 
"I don't understand what you say nowadays. We have always been like this, what's wrong 
with our way of eating? Everyone eats like this." 
"No, not everyone eats like this, Ma." The words were cold and heavy, like stones.  “Gagan, 
Madan-da, Lalati-da, the other people who work for us, do they eat like this?" 
 
"Tsk, but they are servants, they eat differently." 
"Can you explain to me why the servants eat differently while they live in the same house?" 
There was something else in his voice now, something cold and coiled. 
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"This is the way it is. It has always been like this,"  she repeated, conscious now that she was 
failing to give him the right answer, the answer he was looking for. It was as if she had been 
forced to participate in an opaque game, the rules of which she didn't know. [...]. 
"And what has always been must remain that way, must always be for evermore, right?" 
Again, that edge of something like menace. 
"I...I ..don't understand what you're saying." Pause. "I don't understand you anymore." 
"No, you don't". Delivered like three stabs. Then he had got up and left. (Mukherjee, 2014, p. 
74) 
 
In this scene Supratik, a member of a privileged group, is clearly articulating the kind of critical 
consciousness that enables him to see how his very behaviour, the rhythms of his everyday 
life, are part of a system that enables structural injustices to persist while at the same time 
masking and normalising them. Resisting this normalization is a crucial aspect of the process 
Freire describes as conscientization. Freire sometimes talks about this resistance in terms of 
a moral duty: "There is the duty, for example, to never, under any circumstances, accept or 
encourage fatalist positions. There is also the duty of rejecting, for that reason, statements 
such as: 'it is a pity that there are so many among us who go hungry, but that is what reality 
is.’ "(Freire, 2004, p. 37). 
For members of privileged groups, as many theorists have explored in a pedagogical context 
(see Boler, 2004; Boler and Zembylas, 2003, Zembylas and McGlynn, 2012), this process of 
coming to realize how what seems "normal" may in fact be only normal for one's own 
group, and how continuing to accept it as so can constitute a complicity in the ongoing dis-
advantaging of other groups, can be unsettling and uncomfortable.  In a similar vein, Jose 
Medina (2013), drawing on the work of Miranda Fricker, Jane Adams and John Dewey, has 
developed an account of how "perplexity and self-estrangement are of the utmost im-
portance for cognitive, affective, ethical and political learning; democratic sensibilities de-
pend on them". (p. 19) In defending his notion of "epistemic friction", Medina makes a plea 
that could be read as a plea to educators - although he is not talking to or about teachers or 
schools: "By seeking these experiences of perplexity and disruption and using them as 
mechanisms of learning, we can cultivate a social sensibility that opens our eyes, ears and 
hearts to other ways of thinking, feeling and living". (ibid). 
As the above scene makes clear, Supratik's critical consciousness accompanies his growing 
estrangement from the comfortable and familiar life of his family and their social world. His 
physical distaste for the lovingly prepared and delicious dishes that his mother puts before 
him is expressive of a kind of Wittgensteinian "seeing as" where, as Nigel Pleasants explains, 
"to see something ‘as’ something is to see what one hitherto took to be an object of a 
certain kind now as having qualities, relations, implications, or significance, which previously 
one had not seen––‘I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently.’” (Pleasants, 
2008, p. 108) 
Once he has seen his family's privilege for what it is, and understood how it serves to main-
tain a social order in which others are prevented from obtaining anything like a similar level 
of material well-being, Supratik is unable to see their food simply as food.  The abundant, 
cheerful family meals that are such a vital element of life in the Ghosh household, and that 
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are described in mouth-watering detail in the novel, have become a symbol of their complic-
ity in a deeply unjust social order; and a visceral reminder of the hunger of those who are 
excluded from their social world.  
Yet the pedagogical aspects of this sensibility are complex. Some accounts, including Medina's,  
seem to suggest that this estrangement plays an important pedagogical role in the develop-
ment of political understanding, as reflected in Bourdieu's remark that "Political subversion pre-
supposes cognitive subversion; a conversion of the vision of the world..." (Bourdieu, 1982, p. 
127).  However, Supratik's discomfort is, one could argue, already political, for he has already 
been exposed to the political ideas that shape his understanding of structural injustice. What is 
clear, in any event, is how profoundly the emotional and cognitive aspects of this understand-
ing affect him; so profoundly that he is no longer able to tolerate his family's comfortable life; 
that it becomes impossible for him to carry on living as before.  
The process Supratik undergoes can also be described as a kind of cognitive liberation; 
important in the context of pedagogical interaction with oppressed groups who come to 
understand the reasons for their oppression and the possibilities for social change; but also 
crucial in explaining the move from critical consciousness to political action amongst members 
of privileged groups.  As Tarlau explains: “Cognitive liberation is also similar to what Jane 
Mansbridge and Aldon Morris have referred to as ‘oppositional consciousness’ — a mental 
state that develops when people begin identifying with a subordinate group, articulating 
injustices done to that group, opposing those injustices, and seeing the group as having a 
shared interest." (Tarlau, 2014, pp. 379-80). 
These scenes where he is increasingly unsettled by and estranged from his family's daily 
practices indeed form part of the narrative that makes sense of Supratik's growing political 
resolve and his eventual decision to leave the city and join the Naxalites to fight alongside 
the disenfranchised landless peasants in the poorest region of the country.    
But what emerges interestingly from this scene is not just Supratik's increasing sense of 
discomfort with what had previously seemed familiar, but his infuriation with his mother's 
inability to see this.  The perception that those around him are unwilling and unable to see 
things his way, and his realization of the impossibility of getting them and others like them 
to act for justice, increase both his own sense of alienation and his understanding of what is 
needed to bring about real justice for the people around him who are starving. 
The next stage in Supratik's narrative, in fact, follows the account presented by theorists of 
Freire's explanation of the development of critical consciousness, where a recognition of the 
need to transform oppressive social structures entails that “the critically conscious individ-
ual is willing to take risks in resisting oppression” (Smith, in Roberts, 2000, p. 140).  
The detailed descriptions in Supratik's letters of his time spent training with the Naxalites 
and then working and living with desperately poor tenant farmers, preparing the ground for 
collective action, paint a clear picture of his willingness to take risks. He has already risked  - 
indeed perhaps already brought about  - estrangement from his family; damage to his rela-
tionship with his mother that has repercussions for his younger brother and other members 
of the household; he has risked the family's standing in the community and good relation-
ship with the local police force, undermined by the suspicion that they are harbouring a 
Naxalite; and now he risks his own health by subjecting himself to months of back-breaking 
labour and near-starvation.  Yet as the story goes on, the risks become more daring; their 
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likely and real consequences more violent for both Supratik and those around him; and we 
are forced to ask ourselves: What risks are critically conscious individuals prepared to take? 
Could it ever be the case that their political conscience leads them to be willing to risk not 
just their own lives, but those of others? And if so, how can we make sense of this willing-
ness? Is there any epistemic, experiential and emotional processes that can explain it? 
The impoverished tenant farmers who Supratik joins seem to fit Freire's description of peo-
ple in the state of semi-intransitive consciousness:   
 
“Their interests centre almost totally around survival, and they lack a sense of life on a  
more historic plane.  Semi-intransitivity represents a near disengagement between men and  
their  existence. In this state, discernment is difficult.  Men confuse their perceptions of the 
objects and challenges of the environment, and fall prey to magical explanations because 
they cannot apprehend true causality.” (Freire, 1974, p. 14) 
 
The scenes of brutality and degradation at the hands of violent landowners; the  
dehumanizing effects of the daily struggle for the basic means of survival, leave us in no 
doubt as to the sheer hopelessness of the lives of the villagers. Perhaps it is also important 
here to reflect on the words of Franz Fanon who, commenting on the peasantry, said: "It has 
nothing to lose and everything to gain. The under-privileged and starving peasant is the ex-
ploited who very soon discovers that only violence pays.” (Fanon, 2004, p. 23) 
 
In living with the oppressed farmers, sharing their meagre shelter and food, experiencing 
the daily brutality and exploitation to which they are subjected by landowners, police and 
money lenders, Supratik undergoes the kind of embodied experiential learning that is so 
central to Critical Pedagogy. Working with the peasants in the fields, he experiences physical 
challenges and real hunger for the first time in his life: 
His palms and fingers, after weeks of working in a paddy field with a sickle, are  
"…a mad criss-cross of little cuts from the sharp, dry edges of the rice leaves and stalks [...]   
My hands were so sore in the morning […] I couldn't make a fist, so I made myself make a fist 
ten, fifteen, twenty times with each hand. The cracks reopened and beaded with blood.... 
And speaking of sleep, I'd never known sleep like this before – a total wiping out of all sense, 
all consciousness. I hadn’t known exhaustion like this before either; a bone-breaking, bone-
aching tiredness [...]; now I knew yet another reason why everyone in the heart of rural 
Bengal went to sleep so early. When you worked in the fields from six in the morning to four 
in the afternoon the tiredness resulting from it stunned you into silence. You went from 
being a human, animated by a mind and spirit, and consciousness, at the beginning of the 
day, to a machine without a soul at the end of those ten hours, moving your arms and legs 
and mouth because you felt some switch hadn't been turned off " (Mukherjee, 2014, p.145-
146).  
Supratik's experience of the constant, gnawing presence of hunger leads to an important 
insight:  
"The picture of starvation here, the picture that we city-dwellers carried around in our heads 
when we thought of rural poverty, of bony, half-naked people withering to death, was wrong 
- that was what happened during times of famine. In ordinary times, like now, the truth was 
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different: the boniness remained, but it was no longer day after day of fasting; instead, 
weeks and months of hunger, of not having enough to eat, of meagreness and 
undernourishment and weakness.” (p. 175) 
Here is a case of what Medina describes as "the experiential disruptions that arise in 
interaction with significantly different others." (Medina, 2013, p. 19). Medina sees such 
disruptions as "precious opportunities for developing an awareness of our interdependence 
and a critical consciousness of the limitations of our perspective vis a vis others." (ibid).  The 
pedagogical significance of Supratik's physical and emotional immersion in the lives of 
others, though, consists not just in an expansion of his epistemic possibilities and thus a 
fruitful kind of epistemic friction of the type Medina talks about as vital to democracy. It 
also offers a concrete example of what Freire talks about in Pedagogy of Indignation, where 
the indignation is deepened by a growing understanding of the economic conditions that 
make the peasants' lives so materially desperate. 
One day, frustrated, Supratik does the maths, calculating what the farmer who he is living 
with should receive as his share from sharecropping each plot: 
Kanu received eight ser of rice from the first plot and twelve ser from the second; a total of 
half a mon of rice […]. He should have received slightly more than double the amount, just 
over one mon. This would feed him and his family one square meal a day for two months. 
(Mukherjee, 2014, p. 149-50). 
The scene that follows reflects both Supratik's growing indignation and resolve to take 
political action, and the inability of those subjected to ongoing, dehumanizing oppression to 
think beyond their immediate need for survival: 
Kanu said that when the midday meal was given while harvesting this plot, they discovered 
that the portion of rice served to each labourer had been halved. Four other workers 
confirmed this. There were murmurs. Then there were answers from the masters - How could 
you have the cheek to ask for more food…[…] 
I told Kanu that I was going to deal with them. He looked ill with fear and said - Babu, then 
what we are getting is going to go too. Don't make that mistake. Half-stomach is better than 
an empty stomach... (p. 150). 
Seeing Kanu's response, his fear for the lives of his wife and children, both humbles Supratik 
and strengthens his indignation and his resolve to act collectively with the farmers to 
address the injustice with which they are treated; his resolve, though, is to commit a drastic 
and violent act. The culmination of Supratik and his comrades' project of educating the 
farmers in how to organize against exploitation is an operation where they not only destroy 
the paperwork that is trapping them in indentured labour, but brutally murder the landlords 
who have been driving them to starvation and debt. 
Having successfully carried out their first violent attack, the villagers who joined the struggle 
become visibly more hopeful and engaged, and go on to recruit others to the growing 
movement of resistance:  
"Our four new comrades pledged their lives. Anupam said - This is not life that we have. This 
is a kind of death. If we die fighting so that our children can have better lives, we will die 
fighting". (p.307).  
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Supratik and his comrades have, through their own process of critical consciousness, 
engaged in a collective project for social change that has, like all successful critical 
pedagogy, opened up a space where individuals have become fully free to claim their moral 
and political agency. Yet this space has morally unsettling, indeed repugnant aspects to it.   
Supratik, meanwhile, continues to struggle with his own moral and political agency and the 
inescapable ethical dilemmas of his identity.  Returning to the city after months of 
revolutionary guerrilla action in the countryside, he takes up residence again in the family 
home while he prepares for the next stage in the Naxalite strategy of resistance. Back in the 
Ghosh household, Madan, the family servant, is a constant reminder of Supratik’s complex 
and conflicted loyalties.   
One lunchtime, Madan lingers on, annoying Supratik with his usual "You didn't touch your 
food, look what you've made of yourself, all skin-and-bones..." until Supratik realises that 
this mantra is only an excuse; Madan is stalling for time, waiting to have a moment in pri-
vate with him.  
He tries to make it easy for the old man. "Do you have something to say to me?" he asks 
gently once the servants have departed.  
Madan stands apart, at a distance from him, and say, "boro-babu"  -Big Boss, that only half-
ironic term of affection from his childhood has fused to him; there is no hope that Madan-da 
is ever going to call him by his first name - "your mother has survived a lot of pain." 
Supratik does not, cannot, say anything. 
"We are poor people, Boro-babu, what do we know? You and your lot are educated, you've 
read books, been to college, will you listen to what we have to say?" 
"Why don't you try?" 
"Boro-babu, the world does not change, you destroy yourself trying to change it, but it re-
mains as it is. The world is very big and we are very small. Why cause people who love you to 
go through such misery because of it?" 
Once again, what response can he give to this? 
"Your mother took to her bed after you were gone. At first she wouldn't even touch water 
until you returned. I've made a bargain with God, she said. She was shrivelling up like leather 
in the sun. I've known her ever since she came to this house as a daughter-in-law; it burned 
my chest to see her like that" his voice breaks. 
Supratik looks up sharply. Madan-da's eyes are red with unshed tears. Supratik turns his face 
quickly away. 
But Madan reins himself in. "What good will come of all this that you are doing?" He asks. 
"What is it that you think I am doing?" 
Madan answers tangentially, "Being kinder to your near and dear ones - isn't that a bigger 
thing that doing good for the unknown mass of people?" 
A switch is flicked somewhere. It sends through Supratik a surge of cold fury that he is being 
given a lesson in political morality by the family's cook. His answer is like the crack of a whip: 
"Was that what you were doing when you prostrated yourself in front of my grandmother 
after grandfather's heart attack, and went and begged her to forgive you for your son's part 
in gheraoing him? You asked her to mete out whatever punishment she thought fit for your 
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betrayer of a son. Let loose the police on him, let him go to jail, you said. Was that kindness 
to your near and dear ones?" 
[...] Supratik carries on in the face of Madan's unblinking, silent gaze; 
What, have you forgotten? As CPIT stooge, that's what you said your son was. You were 
right, as it turned out, but what did you think was more important - that he served your 
petty interests in not rocking the boat for you or that he fought for the rights of scores who 
have nothing?"  (Mukherjee, 2014, pp. 425-427) 
As A.S. Byatt notes in her review of the book, it is significant that Supratik, in spite of his po-
litical consciousness, cannot here avoid seeing Madan from his family's viewpoint, "their" 
cook.   And his anger at Madan for lecturing him, in this capacity, while himself having 
begged the family to "let loose the police" on Madan's own son, the leader of the striking 
workers, is clearly part of what explains Supratik's resolve, soon after this, to take the ulti-
mate risk in pursuit of his political goals; but also to commit the ultimate act of betrayal. 
(Byatt, 2014). 
 
Supratik has been entrusted with drawing up the strategy for the next stage of Naxalite 
urban action.  But now under heavy armed assault by both Congress and the CPI, their 
group is in urgent need of money to finance their defence; if not, Supratik knows, they will 
be simply wiped out. And so he resolves to steal valuable family jewellery from his aunt's 
collection in order to fund the revolution. The immediate, inevitable and awful consequence 
of this action is that Madan, the loyal family servant who has lived with them for 60 years, is 
targeted by the police as the prime suspect and taken into custody. Madan is eventually 
released, and Supratik, identified as the mastermind behind a spate of Naxalite bombings in 
the city, is arrested.  The final pages of the book describe the awful unravelling of the lives 
of all the central characters in the story; an unravelling set in motion by Supratik's actions 
and by his ultimate confrontation with his own conflicted identity: 
"How can he answer the question that is like a vortex inside him? That it is easier enjoining 
others, in distant villages, to break the walls of their historical conditioning than to do the 
same violence to the fabric of his own social conditioning? Or can he bring himself to do both 
with equal ease? Can he?" (p. 434) 
Although one could characterise Supratik, on the basis of earlier parts of the narrative, as 
someone who has already attained critical consciousness, this scene seems to support the 
account developed by Peter Roberts (1996), who warns against the "systematisation of the 
stages theory which [...] leads to a mechanical theory of consciousness, [...] which  
goes against the grain of  Freire’s dialectical perspective on reality” (p. 184). Drawing on the 
central Freirian notion of praxis, Roberts argues that conscientization, for Freire, is an “ever-
evolving process” (p. 197), akin to the way in which "the pursuit  of  one’s humanisation 
through  praxis is […] an inevitably incomplete process: the transformed  reality which  re-
sults from  reflective  action  always  presents  a  fresh  set  of  (material or social)  
conditions, requiring further reflection.” (Roberts, 1996, p. 187) 
  
The further reflection triggered by the conditions of Supratik's life, however, has lead him to 
make a disturbing choice with terrible consequences for both himself and others. 
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Hope and Hopelessness   
Where, then, does this consideration of Mukherjee's novel leave those of us who still want 
to defend Critical Pedagogy, and what can it contribute to our theoretical perspectives on its 
central concepts and commitments?  
Peter McLaren, drawing on Moylan's account of "critical utopias”, talks of the important 
pedagogical role of articulating and defending “a yearning for what has not yet been 
achieved” (Moylan, in McLaren, 1994, p. 208) and of the politics of hope. But an engage-
ment with the stories of Supratik, Kanu and countless others like them shows forcefully how 
in certain desperately dehumanising and oppressive situations, this yearning for what has 
not yet been achieved can constitute both a vital source of hope and a willingness to com-
mit acts which themselves unsettle basic ethical commitments. 
 
This insight is relevant not just to Supratik’s own choice to put what he sees as his moral ob-
ligations to a political struggle against oppression above his moral obligations to and rela-
tionship with his family; but to the moral cost paid both by the victims of his actions and by 
the agents who he persuades, through his political and pedagogical interventions, to join 
him in the struggle.  Regarding the first choice, there are echoes here of Sartre’s famous de-
scription, in Existentialism and Humanism, of the apparent tension between personal moral-
ity and political struggle. Indeed the above analysis shares with Sartre the insight that the 
answer to the question of what is the right choice to make cannot be given a priori   - for 
“Who can give an answer to that a priori? No one. Nor is it given in any ethical scripture.” 
(Sartre, 1949, p. 213).  
Yet what is added, I think, by a reflection on Supratik’s story, is the important point that at 
the heart of his cognitive and affective process of developing his political consciousness and 
claiming his moral agency, is the uncomfortable realization that this line is impossible to 
draw. For by benefiting from the privilege conferred by a system of oppression, agents in 
positions of privilege - however “innocent” - are complicit in its perpetuation and thereby 
morally culpable for the suffering of others – others whose lives are mostly invisible to 
them. The question, then, for theorists and practitioners of Critical Pedagogy, is not just 
what steps are morally justified in challenging such oppression, in making such lives fully 
visible, but under what conditions does it become possible for agents to act to take these 
steps. Mukherjee’s novel raises the disturbing possibility that perhaps, in situations of 
extreme oppression and desperation, only desperate acts allow people to enact the kind of 
agency required to regain their humanity. 
This possibility is in fact foreshadowed in the harrowing scene that forms the Prelude to the 
book. Nitai Das, a tenant farmer worn down by years of degrading treatment and struggle 
for survival, reduced to begging from his landlord in a desperate attempt to bring home 
food for his wife and young children, who have not eaten for five days, goes home empty 
handed.  In a final attempt to save them from a life of endless misery, he kills his family 
before taking his own life.  
This story is reminiscent of the story of Sethe in Toni Morrison’s novel Beloved, who kills her 
children rather than allow them to become slaves. As Susan Babbitt says in discussing this 
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story, we can make sense of Sethe’s choice as a morally responsible adult, rather than 
dismissing it as immoral and crazy. Yet doing so suggests that “the questions that need to be 
raised are questions not about her but rather about the conditions under which it does in 
fact become reasonable for her to do as she does”. (Babbitt, 1996, p. 4).   Similarly, in 
thinking about the agency of the starving famers in Mukherjee’s novel, we have to recognize 
that their fundamental moral status is itself seen as questionable within the system in which 
they live. If we appreciate “what it means for a system of thoroughgoing subordination and 
degradation to deny human status to some people” (ibid, p. 5), “the question then is what 
kind of resistance can be justified by an understanding of such degradation?”(ibid).  
Medina and others have developed an account of the important role of the social 
imagination in developing strategies of resistance. But for the starving farmers who Supratik 
encounters, the daily struggle for survival is so extreme, so conditioned by systemic 
violence, brutality and degradation, that it may be that this act of imagination is not possible 
until they have been given a real, vivid experience of agency and power. The experience 
itself is violent and horrific, but the narrative raises the disturbing suggestion that the 
strategies for collective mobilization may not have worked without it.  
The novel also problematises the notion of hope. What can we say about the possibilities for 
learning, for moral agency, for critical consciousness, of people who are without hope; 
whose situation seems so hopeless and desperate that only desperate action seems 
possible? 
In fact, the novel ends on a note of hope; yet it is a form of hope which, like the rest of the 
themes of the narrative, is ambiguous; mixed with anger, terror and human suffering.  
After weeks of brutal interrogation at the hands of the police, Supratik, physically and 
mentally broken, is bundled into a police van in the dead of night. In the midst of wondering 
why he is being released, and in a semi-hallucinatory state, he has a vision  - 
...akin to a thing half-dreamed, half-experienced in the raggedy borders between sleep and 
waking - a vision of a near future, maybe fifty years, maybe seventy-five, a hundred, when 
the seeds that he and his kind have been busy sowing have grown, hidden from the human 
eye, or denied until ignorable, into forest cover for most of the country. It brings tears to his 
eyes, and, for the first time in his life, he cries moved by the possibility of fulfilment; not tears 
of joy, but of a kind of proleptic hopefulness. (Mukherjee, 2014, pp. 489-490). 
The policemen shove Supratik out of the van, watch him stumble through the darkness for a 
few metres, and then shoot him in the back of the head. 
The book's Epilogue, set in 2012, describes a guerrilla operation by a highly trained and 
tightly organized squad of Naxalites in the region of Bihar, where destitute villagers are 
subjected to intimidation, rape, and murder for trying to resist the control of their land by 
powerful landowners and mining companies acting with the backing of the military police.  
The group's tactics include planting IED's in the forest to blow up military vehicles. Their 
current operation involves dislodging a part of the railway track with wire-cutters, industrial 
pliers and wrenches, in order to derail a passenger train. It is a trick, the squad leader has 
been told, invented by a Bengali comrade called Supratik, nicknamed Pratik-da, in the late 
Sixties.  Remarking on his "gift to his comrades", the young woman leading the operation 
reflects on the violence and dehumanization that has shaped her own life.  
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"Every human being in this world", she thinks to herself, "wants, strives for, a better life… but 
they are deemed to be below that wanting and striving. Their lives are nothing, less than 
nothing. They are lower than animals..." (ibid, p. 503). 
Throughout Freire’s many essays, books, letters, and interviews, the “unfinishedness of our 
human condition” is referred to repeatedly as the necessary starting point for theorizing 
social transformation. Coming to an awareness of the “unfinishedness” of the human 
condition is similar to the concept of cognitive liberation: identifying a situation as unjust 
and subject to change. But this awareness of unfinishedness in Supratik's case leads to a 
conclusion at once tragic and hopeful:  he is aware of the fact that his own actions have 
played a tiny but valuable part in the inexorable human struggle towards liberation; yet the 
struggle itself, as the book's Epilogue makes clear, is painful, unresolved and full of human 
tragedy. Supratik has reclaimed his moral agency, and has, in some small way, allowed these 
people to claim theirs; but at what cost? 
Peter Roberts (2000, p. 109) has argued that:  “On the Freirian view, taking a risk-laden, po-
tentially contradictory, always constrained stand against oppression is almost invariably 
preferable to taking no stand at all." 
 
Perhaps, as philosophers, we have not given enough attention to the question of what this 
means. The phrase "almost invariably" suggests that there are times when the risks are too 
great; the consequences too dreadful. But this is an idea that demands further exploration: 
Who determines when the risks are too great? Who are they too great for? And for whom is 
it sometimes preferable to take no stand at all? The way to approach these questions is, I 
have suggested, not through seeking a theoretical resolution, but through looking at tough 
cases where individuals make choices to act in desperate situations.  Likewise, we need to 
reflect on Freire's idea that the critically conscious individual is willing to take risks in resist-
ing oppression through looking at the kind of unsettling stories that confront us with diffi-
cult dilemmas about the kinds of risk that individuals involved in struggles for social justice 
do take, and through asking ourselves not just why and how they were able to take them, 
but whether they were right to do so. Again, I am not suggesting that these questions have 
straightforward answers, but asking them can add a valuable dimension to how we think 
about oppression, social justice, and individual and collective moral agency.  
 
In 1986, the anthropologist David Fetterman published a review of Freire’s The Politics of 
Education in the American Anthropologist. He ended his review with a troubling question: 
 
“How is Freire's humanistic and liberating ideology reconciled with the logical conclusion of 
his pedagogy -- the physical violence of revolutionary change?" (Fetterman, 1986, p. 254). 
 
My discussion may be construed as a version of this same question. Yet while I would 
strongly dispute its premise - that violent revolutionary change is a logical conclusion of 
Freire's position - I think it does hint at something important. For it is surely the case that a 
process of conscientization, especially in situations themselves characterized by violence, 
physical oppression and brutality - can sometimes lead to a conviction of the necessity for 
revolutionary change of a violent nature.  What I want to reject, though, is the implication 
that this is a serious theoretical failing; one that can be resolved either by dismissing Freire's 
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analysis, critique and normative framework, or by arguing that a truly Freirian dialogical, hu-
manistic critical pedagogy can only lead to a commitment to non-violent resistance. Rather, 
I suggest that we need to take seriously cases in which critical consciousness does lead indi-
viduals to take terrible risks and make ethically troubling choices in their fight against op-
pression, and to reflect on what insights these cases can yield for our understanding of the 
complex picture of the connection between moral agency and political action.  These are 
questions of profound educational significance for, as Claudia Card argues, “If oppressive in-
stitutions stifle and stunt the moral development of the oppressed, how is it possible, what 
does it mean, for the oppressed to be liberated? What is there to liberate? What does it 
mean to resist, to make morally responsible choices, to become moral agents, to develop 
character?” (Card, 1991, p.25). 
 
The anthropologist’s question, then, is not to be answered from a theoretical perspective 
outside the experience of real struggles for social justice. It may well be that, in the class-
rooms with which most of us are familiar and in which we hope our children will learn and 
our trainee teachers will teach, ethically sensitive, politically conscious educators can en-
gage in a meaningful pedagogical process  that dignifies all students as moral agents, helps 
them to understand the structures of oppression operating in their societies, and encour-
ages a commitment to justice, moral indignation in the face of injustice, and the humility to 
listen to the voices of the marginalized and to fight with them in solidarity and in hope.  But 
in places beyond these classrooms, places where there are no classrooms, where anger is so 
huge and hope so elusive, the process of coming to critical consciousness may lead to far 
more unsettling consequences.  If Critical Pedagogy involves, amongst other things, making 
the classroom a place in which children can understand and develop their own moral agency 
and reflect on the connection between moral agency and social change, perhaps they can 
do so more rigorously if we encourage them to reflect not just on stories of successful strug-
gles against oppression, but on stories of failed struggles. Perhaps critical educators can en-
courage students to consider the lives and actions not just of real and fictional characters 
like Rosa Parks and Atticus Finch, but of characters like Supratik and Nitai Das; to ask our-
selves seriously how we can understand their choices and their actions, what they mean, 
and what their significance is in the networks of social interaction and epistemic practices 
that form part of the unfinished project of creating a more just world.  
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